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<CA>David M. Bell 
<AFF>Newcastle University, U.K. 
 
<abs>Abstract 
This article pays “subversive fidelity” to utopia by rethinking what might be meant by the 
“good,” “no,” and “place”; and how they might be brought together in an ambiguous but 
productive consistency. Specifically, it does this by drawing on Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza’s ethics, Sara Ahmed’s concept of the “affect alien,” and Doreen Massey’s 
understanding of place. It then applies and develops the theoretical approach through a 
reading of Anarres, as described in Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed. Whilst 
While the theory of utopia produced is intended normatively, the article also shows how 
it can be used as a methodology for the reading of specific places;, as well as and also 
how it can be used alongside other utopian studies methods to read utopian texts.</abs> 
 
<ky>Keywords: utopia, place, power, affect, The Dispossessed</ky> 
<#> 
It is has been five hundred years since the term “utopia” was coined; and in that time it 
has been widely (mis)read, (ab)used, and distorted. This is no bad thing in and of itself, 
for meanings change over time; and as Ernst Bloch notes, “tTo limit the utopian to the 
Thomas More variety, or simply to try to orientate it in that direction, would be like 
trying to reduce electricity to the amber from which it gets its Greek name and in which it 
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was first noticed. Indeed, the utopian coincides so little with the novel of the ideal state 
that the whole totality of philosophy becomes necessary . . . to do justice to the content of 
that designated by utopia.”1 Nonetheless, I often find myself dissatisfied with particular 
applications of “utopia”: not only colloquially; but also in contemporary utopian studies, 
in which “place”—one of utopia’s three constituent terms—is often sidelined, leaving 
utopia as a function of thought or a temporal process.2 
 Here, I propose to pay “subversive fidelity” to More’s term by considering how 
we might conceive of “place,” along with utopia’s other two constituent terms: “good” 
and “no.” I consider how these concepts might function; and how they might be thought 
together to rethink utopia. (Un)fortunately, I do not have the “whole totality of 
philosophy” at my disposal, but I offer an understanding of place inspired by recent 
geographical theory; draw on Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza to develop an “ethical,” 
affective account of “the good”; and turn to Sara Ahmed’s critique of happiness to 
theorisetheorize “the no.” These approaches are brought together to develop a particular 
understanding of utopia as a place constituted by particular affective relations (“affective 
utopia”), which is developed through a reading of Anarres, as described in Ursula K. Le 
Guin’s The Dispossessed (although ultimately I argue that Anarres probably cannot be 
thought of as an affective utopia). This provides some “flesh” on the bones of theory 
whilest showing how a theory of affective utopianism can be used to read spatial practice. 
Thinking through The Dispossessed’s subtitle (“An Ambiguous Utopia”), meanwhile, 
allows me to show how affective utopia is a doubly ambiguous form: once at the level of 
its constitution, once at the level of judgement. 
 The affective theory of utopia developed can be read both methodologically and 
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normatively. It does not offer an analysis of a particular historical tendency, nor attempt 
to create a general working definition of utopia (although this is not to say that it is 
entirely divorced from “fictional” and “real” spatial practice: indeed, it is heavily 
informed by them). It offers a form of utopianism I think it would be productive to adopt 
in struggle; and whilest I do not believe that any form of utopia(nism) could be politically 
sufficient in and of itself, it is an approach I favour; and is an approach that can be used 
to read particular places, whether “real” or “fictional.,” although tThis does not have to 
be to the exclusion of other theoretical approaches, which I draw on in the final section of 
this essay to argue that some of Anarres’s failings cannot be separated from the silences 
and inconsistencies in Le Guin’s narrative. 
 
<1>Place 
My insistence on the importance of place for utopia is motivated by pragmatism rather 
than etymological pedantry, for it is place that provides utopia’s conceptual specificity. 
Whilest all concepts of “the good” implicitly point to (even if they deny) a “good place,” 
it is possible to engage in a discussion of “the good” without making explicit reference to 
the places that result from or prefigure it. Negativity, meanwhile, is often positioned 
against place.3 The conceptual power of utopia stems from the fact that it thinks both “the 
good” and “the no” in terms of the “real” or “imaginary” places that these concepts might 
produce. Yet place is rarely paid explicit attention in utopian studies. David Harvey’s 
Spaces of Hope argues for place as a part of utopianism, but does not consider its 
function as a constituent part of utopia in any depth.4 Where there is engagement with 
what might be called “places” in utopian studies, their internal operations are often 
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sidelined; and there is no reflection on precisely what the concept “place” does for the 
concept “utopia.” Here, I outline three reasons for this: (1) a privileging of utopia’s 
function over its content,; (2) the use of the term “utopia” to refer to a method,; and (3) a 
privileging of the temporal over the spatial. 
 Perhaps as a result of the strength of literary approaches in utopian studies, utopia 
is often approached hermeneutically: the main object of study is the function of utopia-
as-text. This approach has both negative and positive modes: tThe former privileges 
“estrangement,” with utopian texts held to unpick readers’ certainty about the finitude or 
necessity of the present;5 whilest the latter focuses on how utopian texts “educate desire” 
for a world other than that which exists.6 For some, these functions can be separated from 
the precise content of a given text; or are strengthened by the failure of the text to satisfy 
or convince. As Ruth Levitas writes, summarising summarizing Miguel Abensour, 
“[t]The point is not whether one agrees or disagrees with the institutional arrangements, 
but rather that the utopian experiment disrupts the taken-for-granted nature of the 
present.”7 Fredric Jameson, meanwhile, argues that the failure of the utopian text to 
escape the conditions of its production provides utopia with its estranging power (best 
understood, he says, as an “anti-anti-utopianism”).8 In contrast, Tom Moylan offers 
detailed descriptions of the “critical” utopian societies in four novels (including The 
Dispossessed), and argues that their complexity means that they are likely to have a more 
profoundly estranging effect on their readers.9 Similarly, John P. Clark argues that “the 
most powerful utopian works are also profoundly topian—they create a vivid sense of 
place grounded in deeply experienced realities”;10 whilest Ruth Levitas states that close 
engagement with the content of a utopian text is required in order for its affirmative 
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potential to be realisedrealized; and argues that this potential is greatest when the text 
presents an alternative society in considerable detail. Here, then, we find that the place 
described by a utopian text is of importance, but the primary focus remains on the 
relationship between the text and its reader,; rather than on the content of the text (i.e., the 
qualities of the place) itself. The method, function, or operation of utopia is privileged 
over a consideration of utopia-as-place.11 This is, of course, extremely useful—and can 
be utilisedutilized alongside the method I develop here—but its dominance in the field 
perhaps obscures other ways of approaching utopia. 
 This is particularly the case when the approach is developed such that the utopian 
method/function/operation is named “utopia.” This semantic shift is the second way in 
which utopia-as-place is obscured in utopian studies. Here, rather than “utopia” 
functioning as a place that inspires estrangement and/or the education of desire, it 
describes the reading of utopian texts and the effect this has on readers. Darko Suvin 
refers to utopia as “a method rather than a state” and so something that “cannot be 
realized or not realized—it can only be applied”;12 whilest Jameson describes utopia as 
“an operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future” (at 
times conflating this with his “anti-anti-utopianism”).13 For Ruth Levitas, utopia 
constitutes an “imaginary reconstitution of society”; and includes the act of writing—as 
well as reading—the utopian text. 
 Whilest I do not deny that there are operations, functions, and methods of utopia 
(both estranging and affirmative), I do not accept the claim that these are utopia. 
Referring to them as such leaves no term for the places that catalysecatalyze this 
operation,; collapses utopia into radical or critical thought more broadly,; and leaves the 
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analysts in the awkward position of having to make clear every time they use the term 
“utopia” whether they are naming the textual “good place” that catalyses catalyzes a 
process of thought, or the process itself. 
 The final manner in which place is sidelined in utopian studies is the positioning 
of utopia as a temporal—rather than spatial—phenomenona. Here, the focus is on those 
who experience or produce utopia directly rather than those who encounter it textually. 
Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, for example, positions utopia as a temporal force 
immanent to in a number of “everyday” activities, expressing an immanent collective 
desire for a state of abundance and fulfillment that has not- yet arrived (which he names 
Heimat or the Ultimum).14 This expands the scope of utopia, but does not help us to 
address how utopia-as-place might function, and the temporal tendency Bloch names 
utopia would be better referred to as utopianism or “the utopian.” This is the approach 
recommended (although inconsistently applied) by Angelika Bammer, who brings Bloch 
into dialogue with a utopian trend in 1970s feminism; and argues for the replacement of 
“‘a utopia’ as something fixed . . . with the idea of ‘the utopian’ as an approach 
toward.”15 Yet, if utopia is no longer a category we can use, what is this an approach 
toward? 
 Moving away from this Blochian teleology, a number of feminist, anarchist, and 
autonomist approaches to utopia have implicitly or explicitly favoured the temporal 
aspects of utopia over the spatial. Lucy Sargisson articulates a feminist utopianism that 
“constantly affirm[s] play, process and dynamism,” but does not explicitly articulate how 
this produces place;16 whilest Lisa Garforth figures Deleuze and Guattari’s “lines of 
flight” as a utopian gesture, but does not explore the places these might produce.17 
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Valérie Fournier uses “utopianism rather than ‘utopia’ to emphasize movement over 
static visions of a better order,”18 a move referenced (and implicitly adopted) by Ruth 
Kinna.19 Judith Suissa outlines an “anarchist utopianism” in her analysis of anarchist 
schools—which are explicitly figured as “spaces”—but does not call these utopias and is 
hostile to the term.20 Similarly, Andy Robinson and Simon Tormey argue that “[a]t the 
most basic level, utopia is not a particular space or place but a movement or flow which 
in turn may create new spatial possibilities.”21 What, then, do we call these spaces, or 
spatial possibilities? 
 Others are closer to the position I adopt below and refer to them as utopias. 
Harvey argues for a “spatiotemporal utopianism” that seeks to dialectically unify 
Blochian “utopias of process” and spatialized “social utopias.” This dialectical back-and-
forth sees space and time as distinct (even opposing) forms, however, with time 
associated with process and place associated with closure: the approach I take below sees 
them as inherently intra-interconnected. Laurence Davis writes of the prefigurative 
“grounded utopias” generated by social movements, with the term “grounded” 
emphasizing both their spatial nature and the fact that they are immanent rather than 
transcendent.22 Uri Gordon argues that “anarchist utopias are . . . places created by the 
actions of individuals and communities taking history into their own hands”;23 and 
Carissa Honeywell identifies an anarchist utopianism in the work of thinkers such as Paul 
Goodman and Colin Ward, which is spatially present “beneath” society.24 With the 
exception of Harvey, however, these thinkers do not reflect on precisely what “place” 
means; nor how it might function in “utopia.” It is to this task that I now turn. 
 Place is, of course, closely related to space—a concept treated with suspicion in 
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radical thought, in which it is often understood as an ahistorical form constituted of either 
of inertia or chaos.25 Place fares even worse, frequently understood as space imbued with 
a fixed, essential, and authentic identity.26 Attempts to create “good places,” then, have 
been seen as attempts to create oases cut off from material dynamics of social change 
(when really it is time that will redeem us); and/or as the once-and-for-all establishment 
of authoritarian perfectionism—the top-down application of a predetermined vision of 
“the good” on a supposedly inert or chaotic volume of space (and its inhabitants). 
 Whilest there are utopian studies scholars who position utopia as a perfect, 
hierarchical place,27 and utopia can function as an oasis cut off from historical operations 
of power, insisting on the “topos” of utopia does not necessitate such a philosophy. 
Rather, it is possible to turn to approaches that see space (re)produced through the 
changing relations of bodies; and which (re)producinges these bodies.28 Following Karen 
Barad, I frame these relations as “intra-actions” rather than “interactions,” in order to 
stress that the bodies do not pre-exist this coming together but are produced through it.29 
In thinking how these intra-actions produce space, the focus shifts from “enumerating” 
space by describing what occurs in it, to describing the becomings that (re)produce it.30 
These becomings will be of a particular character, of course,: shaped by any number of 
factors, and so “place” can be taken to refer to “particular articulations” of spatial 
relations, as Doreen Massey argues. “If space is . . . a simultaneity of stories-so-far,” she 
writes, “then places are collections of those stories, articulations within the wider power-
geometries of space. Their character will be a product of those intersections within that 
wider setting, and what is made of them. And, too, of the non-meetings-up, the 
disconnections and the relations not established, the exclusions.”31 
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 This can be illustrated with reference to Anarres, the “anarchist” moon of the 
planet Urras (a fictional surrogate for 1970s Earth, from where which Anarres’s founders 
emigrated a couple of hundred years before the action in the novel),32 on which much of 
Ursula (K.) Le Guin’s 1974 novel The Dispossessed is set (the remainder is set on Urras, 
or in transit between the two worlds). Anarres is a itself a major actor in the novel,33 
making The Dispossessed one of the “profoundly topian” novels that Clark references; 
and suitable for analysis through the lens of place (though I note below that it is 
important to step back and provide a more textual analysis as well).34 Implicitly 
referencing understandings of place critiqued above, Winter ElliottJennifer Rodgers 
argues that Anarres provides “a working model for utopia as evolution—not a place, but 
a process of becoming,” (emphasis added),35 but Davis disagrees, noting that it is 
animated by “a generous Spirit of Place.”36 This “spirit” can most clearly be identified in 
the understanding of place shown by Shevek, the novel’s main character,; and resonates 
with the alternative approach outlined above. SocialisedSocialized by Anarres’s 
“Odonian” ideology—and inspired by his research in temporal physics—Shevek believes 
(with echoes of Heraclitus) that: “[y]ou shall not go down twice to the same river. Nor 
can you go home again.” Yet he rejects a straightforward privileging of becoming over 
place (or even their separation), adding: “wWhat is most changeable is shown to be 
fullest of eternity, and your relationship to the river, and the river’s relationship to you 
and to itself, turns out to be at once more complex and more reassuring than a mere a lack 
of identity. You can go home again . . . so long as you understand that home is a place 
where you have never been.”37 This invocation of place-in-becoming resonates with 
(half-forgotten) Odonian ontology, which states that “[t]o be whole is to be part; true 
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voyage is return.”38 
 Extrapolating from Massey’s definition of place, it can be said that to call a place 
a utopia means privileging particular connections and exclusions; and framing these 
through the “ambiguous consistency” of the “good” and the “no.” Such an editorial role 
requires responsibility; and judgement about whether a place is or is not utopia (or even 
is a dystopia) can only ever be provisional, partial, and situated. This, then, is the double 
ambiguity of utopia that I referred to earlier: it is constituted by ambiguity, and labelling 
a place “utopia” is always an ambiguous task.39 Before either of these ambiguities can be 
shown in action, however, an account of the concept of the “good” is necessary. 
 
<1>The “Good’ 
Lyman Tower Sargent argues that “[p]erfect, perfection, and their variants are freely used 
by scholars in defining utopias. They should not be.”40 Normatively speaking, I agree. 
Yet an empirico-historical approach to the concept of utopia must include such 
understandings because—whether or not they are understood by their authors, founders, 
or inhabitants as perfect places—the history of utopia contains a number of (fictional and 
real) places to which perfection is ascribed.41 Such places are oriented toward a particular 
understanding of “the good” that—once realisedrealized—is held to remove the need for 
further change. 
 It is my contention that such places would not be “good” to inhabit, and that this 
understanding of the good is hostile to the understanding of place outlined above.42 To 
avoid this, I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, from whom he draws a 
distinction between morality and ethics: the former as a system of thought seeking to fix 
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life around a predetermined vision of the good,; the latter as an “affective” approach 
where the good emerges immanently.43 A useful starting point here is Deleuze’s 
definition of the ethical good and bad as: 
 
<ext>two senses of the variation of the power of acting: the decrease of this 
power (sadness) is bad; its increase (joy) is good. . . . Objectively, then, 
everything that increases or enhances our power of acting is good, and that which 
diminishes or restrains it is bad; and we only know good and bad through the 
feeling of joy or sadness of which we are conscious. . . . Since the power of acting 
is what opens the capacity for being affected to the greatest number of things, a 
thing is good “which so disposes the body that it can be affected in a greater 
number of ways.”44</ext> 
 
It is this “ethical” concept of the good that forms a constitutive feature of the utopianism I 
outline here. 
 Before going further, it is important to unpack two (related) points, which 
challenge any necessary opposition between the individual and the collective. Firstly, 
“body” does not simply refer to the physical dimensions of the individual subject. Rather, 
it relates to a “dynamic ensemble of relations . . . defined by its affective capacity.”45 A 
building, then, may be a body,; as may a piece of technology, a crowd, a single human 
being, or a place. Changes to a body’s affective capacity occur through intra-actions 
“below,” “alongside,” or “above” the body. Thus, I avoid the term “individual” (except as 
a critical category) in favour of Lewis Hyde’s use of the term “dividual”: a figure 
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“constituted by the complexity of the world around” them themhim [or her].”46 
 This leads me on to the second point I wish to make about this understanding of 
the body: that an increase in or enhancement of a body’s power to act also increases its 
power to be acted upon (and vice- versa). Good relations of power are mutual: the 
increase of one dividual’s power increases the power of other dividuals to act; —and thus 
of the collective to act. Starhawk emphasisesemphasizes this by referring to “power-
with,” a term useful for decentering individualism.47 This is a form of non-hierarchy, with 
power held and produced in common; and it produces considerable freedom, understood 
as “the possibility of something new and truly different coming about.”48 This “new” 
does not emerge at a pre-given moment; but, rather, at times of “singularity,” akin to the 
bifurcation of a curve,49 troubling the understanding of time as a homogeneous, 
irreversible succession of moments.50 This, I maintain, is a communist politics: 
communist in the sense that power is held in common (and this must necessarily include 
goods and land); and in the sense of being “the real movement which abolishes the 
present state of things.”51 
 Anarres is (in part) (re)produced through this “good.” Property and land is are 
held in common, but this is far from the communism of liberal fantasy: Le Guin explicitly 
notes that the Anarresti retain their (in)dividuality.52 Strength is understood to come 
through power-with: having been told that “[t]he law of evolution is that the strongest 
survives,” Shevek replies by saying, “Yes, and the strongest, in the existence of any 
social animal, are those who are most social. In human terms, the most ethical.”53 To be 
ethically good is to work with others for the mutual increase of affective capacities; and 
being open to the affective encounter is an ethical imperative, for “to lock out is to lock 
 13 
in.”54 This communal strength (“power-with”) is also figured as a freedom-in-common: 
“It’s your nature to be Tirin,” says Shevek to a friend, “and my nature to be Shevek, and 
our common nature to be Odonians, responsible to one another. And that responsibility is 
our freedom. To avoid it, would be to lose our freedom.”55 Pravic, the language spoken 
on Anarres, also plays a role in reproducing these good power relations; and is so 
successful that Shevek struggles to understand the Urrasti concepts of “superiority and 
inferiority.”56 
 
<1>The “No” 
Thus far, Anarres appears straightforwardly utopian. But we cannot abandon Anarres (or 
utopia) here—we only have “the good place.” There is no ambiguity: attention must be 
paid to the “no.” One way to do this would be to note that such “good places” could 
never exist in reality because of the inevitability of relationships of domination emerging, 
even where there is no formal hierarchy.57 Domination is ethically “bad” as it reduces the 
ability of bodies to affect and be affected. It is a “disaffecting”58 force that reproduces 
any given place as a dystopia (“bad place”).59 
 Domination on Anarres is illustrated through Shevek’s relationship with Sabul, 
his senior Uuniversity colleague. Given Anarres’s supposed nonhierarchy, seniority 
should be strictly a matter of age, but it is obvious to the reader (and eventually Shevek) 
that Sabul informally dominates Shevek. Whilest Shevek wants the “ansible” he is 
developing (a device for instantaneous communication between any two points in space) 
to be available for the common good, Sabul wishes to appropriate it for private gain. He 
behaves, in other words, as an individual.60 Shevek’s faith in Anarres-as-utopia thus 
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becomes dangerous, for it allows Sabul’s domination to pass unnoticed. Utopia-as-place 
is separated from the processes of utopianism needed to constantly (re)produce it. 
Whilest a hierarchical distribution of power (at least one with any sense of permanence) 
is incompatible with utopianism as described here, it is not enough to believe that 
nonhierarchical organisationorganization automatically and permanently creates a utopia: 
“tyrannies of habit”61 ossify social relations and prevent new becomings, limiting 
freedom. As the Urrasti Vea points out to Shevek, in some respects it might be better to 
have a formal hierarchy—at least then your enemy is visible.62 Indeed, Sabul exploits the 
invisibility of domination—and Shevek’s faith in Anarres- as -utopia—by claiming that 
“this isn’t some kind of hierarchy” in an attempt to prevent Shevek challenging his 
power.63 Whilest Pravic may enable the Anarresti to reproduce the good more easily 
because hierarchy is unthinkable, it also prevents them from recognisingrecognizing 
domination when it occurs. 
 Domination and “locking out” are not only internal to Anarres: they also mark its 
relationship with Urras. The Dispossessed opens on Anarres with a description of “a 
wall” which that “did not look important.” Despite its modesty, the wall is a border: it 
functions to keep out Urrasti residents and so prevents intra-actions that might threaten 
the social order (as with all borders, it is reinforced by xenophobia).64 This attempt to 
keep Urras separate is in part designed to prevent statist behaviours from Urras from 
disrupting the functioning of Anarres; yet it ends up contributing to Anarres’s 
ossification, and brings to mind more obviously authoritarian “walled” utopias such as 
the City of the Sun described by Campanella.65 
 It is tempting to say, then, that utopia is “no place” because it is impossible to 
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realiserealize. The very techniques the Anarresti have developed to create a utopia have 
resulted in its ossification towards dystopia.66 Yet this argument smacks of the liberal 
defeatism in which any attempt to realiserealize a utopia necessarily results in a dystopia 
(a move which that proclaims our own world as utopian as it disavows the utopian). I 
want to suggest that “ambiguously” bringing the “no” and the “good” together such that 
they obtain a consistency enables us to see utopia as a possibility. To do this, I want to 
focus on the role of Shevek’s friend Bedap, who notices Sabul’s domination, links it to 
broader operations of power on Anarres,; and tries to make Shevek aware of it. Initially, 
Shevek rejects him and repeats his faith in Anarres-as-utopia: 
 
<ext>“What are you talking about, Dap? We have no power structure.” 
 “No? What makes Sabul so strong?” 
 “Not a power, structure, a government. . . .” 
 “No. We have no government, no laws, all right. But as far as I can see, 
ideas never were controlled by laws and governments. . . . You can’t crush ideas 
by suppressing them. You can only crush them by ignoring them. By refusing to 
think—refusing to change. And that’s precisely what our society is doing! Sabul 
uses you where he can, and where he can’t, he prevents you from publishing, 
from teaching, even from working. Right? In other words, he has power over you. 
Where does he get it from? Not from vested authority, there isn’t any. Not from 
intellectual excellence, he hasn’t any. He gets it from the innate cowardice of the 
average human mind. Public opinion! That’s the power structure he’s part of, and 
knows how to use. The unadmitted, inadmissible government that rules the 
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Odonian society by stifling the individual mind.”67</ext> 
 
Bedap explicitly figures these operations of power as an example of “disaffection,” 
asking Shevek if he has ever thought about: “what the analogic mode calls ‘disease,’ 
social disaffection, discontent, alienation, that this might analogically also be called 
pain—what you meant when you talked about pain, suffering? And that, like pain, it 
serves a function in the organism?”68 Here, Bedap moves towards figuring Anarres as a 
dystopia. Yet, by turning to the work of Sara Ahmed and reading Bedap as “affect 
alien,”69 it is possible to see this articulation of disaffection as a utopian moment. Here 
we arrive at the second way in which utopia is ambiguous. 
 The “affect alien” is the dividual who does not “correctly” perform happy affect. 
“Maintaining public comfort”—the unambiguous celebration of Anarres-as-utopia, in this 
case—requires them to “‘go along with it,’ to agree to where [they] are placed,” because 
“[t]o refuse to be placed would mean to be seen as trouble, as causing discomfort for 
others.” Thus, “[t]here is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad 
feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what 
feelings to whom.”70 The aAffect aliens is are disempowered: their ability to participate 
in the intra-actions that create place is reduced. Should they attempt to articulate their 
negative feelings, it is they who are identified as (and blamed for being) the source of this 
negativity.71 Thus, Shevek resents Bedap’s articulations of domination on Anarres, even 
reacting “violently” to his arguments.72 Ahmed, however, argues that the “badness” may 
well emanate from the supposed “good place” (though she talks about “objects,” rather 
than places per se). Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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 Yet Anarresti could (ambiguously) reproduce Anarres- as- utopia by not 
“presum[ing] bad feelings are backward and conservative and good feelings are forward 
and progressive”; and not seeing bad feelings as “oriented to the past, as a kind of 
stubbornness that ‘stops’ the subject from embracing the future.”73 Rather, the 
articulation of Anarres’s “badness” should be understood as potentially productive: the 
estranging “no” of the affect alien can open space for freedom. —“To share what 
deviates from happiness is to open up possibility, to be alive to possibility.”74 Indeed, 
eventually Shevek is prepared to receive Bedap’s “bad feelings,” and these play an 
important role in persuading him to travel to Urras, where he has the breakthrough that 
allows him to create the “ansible”; and is inspired to organiseorganize for change on 
Anarres by Urrasti anticolonial activists. Bedap and Shevek’s “no” to Anarres thus opens 
up new intra-actions: they come into a productively ambiguous relationship with the 
“good” and—ultimately—help increase the capacity of bodies across the universe to 
affect and be affected by each other,75 enhancing both intensive and extensive power-
with. 
 This “no” is, then, ambiguously consistent with the understanding of the “good” 
developed above; and attests to the importance of seeing those “who refuse to let go of 
suffering, who are even prepared to kill some forms of joy” as “an alternative model of 
the social good”: what Clark refers to as a “discordant harmony.”76 Sometimes the joyful 
“yes” of good intra-actions may be the driving force of utopianism; sometimes it may be 
the act of saying “no” to actions that hinder such intra-actions. David Eden’s argument is 
pertinent here. For him, we should not “create a paradigm that sees some kind of split 
between ‘Noes’ and ‘Yeses.’ Rather . . . our attempts to fundamentally change social 
 18 
relations always have these elements bound up within each other. It is an error to argue 
that one must precede the other.”77 The good and the no, in other words, can work 
together to (re)produce “the good place that is no place.” 
 This utopianism does not progress “from one point to another”—as in Oscar 
Widle’s Wilde’s famous claim that humanity sees a better country (utopia) and then sets 
sail for it78—but is “perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival.”79 
Thus, as has hopefully become clear, this utopianism (as a temporal organisingorganizing 
force) is not oriented to a utopian blueprint (though utopian visions may play a heuristic 
role in affective utopianism). Rather, it produces utopias (as places); and these places 
begat beget further utopianism (to the extent that they do not ossify towards dystopia). 
Utopianism’s temporality and utopia’s spatiality are mixed together and cannot be 
separated as they are in Wilde’s analogy of voyage and arrival. This resonates with 
contemporary arguments in geography and physics which that state that space and time 
cannot be fully separated.80 The affective utopia is thus prefigurative, but it is not 
prefigurative of a final form; rather—to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari on 
immanence—it is “prefigurative only to itself.”81 It is this sense of impermanence that—
the reader hopes—Shevek and the revolutionary syndicate will reintroduce to Anarres. 
 
<1>Anarres’s Silences and Inconsistencies 
There remain, however, a number of relations of domination on Anarres that it seems 
Shevek and the syndicate will not challenge, because they seem entirely unaware of their 
existence. Here, perhaps, it becomes difficult to separate these characters’ ignorance of 
these relationships of domination from Le Guin’s; and it is important to remember 
 19 
Levitas’s claim that readers must attend to the “silences and inconsistencies” of utopias—
to their absences as well as their presences.82 Where these places are represented 
fictionally their silences and inconsistencies are likely to reflect the author’s prejudices or 
inconsistencies (which will, of course, also tell us about the social conditions in which 
they were produced). Thus, the place-based approach to utopia I develop here is 
inadequate unless utilisedutilized alongside more text-centric approaches to utopia. This 
is particularly the case when the place in question is fictional, but even where the place 
exists any articulation of it will always be partial and creative and thus open to various 
forms of textual analysis. 
 Despite Le Guin’s undoubted commitment to anarchism and emancipation from 
patriarchy and oppression, Anarres and the narrative structure of The Dispossessed are 
marked by a number of “silences and inconsistencies.” Samuel Delany and Tom Moylan 
have pointed to the persistence of the heteronormative nuclear family as a dominant and 
seemingly unchallenged form of social reproduction on Anarres (albeit with tolerance of 
bisexual polyamory, at least for men), despite the clear limits this places on the ability of 
women,  and queer and gender non-conforming subjectss to increase their affective 
capacities,; and to specific instances of sexism both on Anarres and in Le Guin’s 
narrative.83 These misogynistic elements (of both Shevek and The Dispossessed) become 
particularly apparent through the description of a serious sexual assault Shevek commits 
on Urras (at a party he ejaculates—without permission—on Vea’s dress).84 Whilest such 
an event could function as a clear warning against unambiguously celebrating Shevek as 
a hero, the narrative around it serves largely as an indictment of Urrasti culture rather 
than calling into question the extent to which misogyny on Anarres might have been 
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responsible. This means that Shevek is never made to come to terms with his abuse, and 
the episode can even be read as humanisinghumanizing him, exacerbating the misfortune 
in Le Guin choosing a handsome male to be her “affect alien.”85 After all, Ahmed’s affect 
aliens occupy positions of structural disadvantage in society: Shevek—however 
individually frustrated he may be—does not. Anarres has seemingly done away with 
white supremacy (or perhaps it was never an issue, though this seems unlikely given the 
colonial dynamics on Urras, and Le Guin can certainly be criticisedcriticized for not 
tackling this86), but patriarchy remains; and there is nothing to suggest that Shevek and 
his comrades recogniserecognize this. Furthermore, Shevek is frequently figured—by Le 
Guin, by other Anarresti, and by himself—as an individual enacting power-to rather than 
a dividual dependent upon those around him for power-with. As quoted above, Bedap, for 
example, associates Shevek’s “individual mind” with change (and identifies “the public” 
as the force preventing change); whilest Shevek speaks of his “own initiative” as “the 
only initiative I acknowledge”87 when explaining why he travelled to Urras (he was 
actually persuaded to travel by his wife, Takver,; and through his numerous intra-actions 
with Bedap). 
 This individualism is not simply a property of Anarres, but is freqeuntlyfrequently 
repeated through Le Guin’s narrative, which displays a tendency to privilege the 
individual over the collective rather than show them in a mutual intra-action. We never 
see the operation of Shevek’s revolutionary syndicate, for example,88 although we are 
shown Shevek’s involvement in collective struggle on Urras, with the suggestion that this 
informs his actions on Anarres. Bedap, meanwhile, appears only occasionally (to 
“alienate” Shevek) before being rather brutally dispensed with: his “affect alienation” is 
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thoroughly instrumentalisedinstrumentalized—we never learn if whether his capacity to 
affect or be affected is increased. All of this means that Anarres— and The 
Dispossessed— at times repeat liberal-patriarchal tropes; and serves as a reminder of the 
importance of Jameson’s argument that utopian texts never fully escape the conditions of 
their production. 
 The question still remains, however: iIs Anarres an affective utopia? Any answer 
to this question can only ever be provisional: despite the reader enjoying a broader view 
than any single Anarresti citizen, the readers remains reliant on Le Guin to guide them, 
and there are many things they are not shown. (tThis returns us to Massey’s definition of 
places as collections of stories about a particular space: wWhat stories are we not told? 
How might the place of Anarres be different if someone other than Le Guin “collected” 
these stories, or if Le Guin had “collected” these stories later in her life, when her views 
of gendered inequality had changed?). Thus, we return to the first aspect of Anarres’s—
and affective utopianism’s—double ambiguity. Anarres’s status as a utopia is ambiguous 
(a fact complicated by its necessarily partial narration by Le Guin); and if it is a utopia, it 
is one constituted by the ambiguous intra-action of the good and the no. I am inclined to 
say that Anarres is not an affective utopia; —or at least that it is not one at any point (in 
space and time) during the narrative of The Dispossessed: not because bad intra-actions 
remain prominent in its social ordering, but because they remain unchallenged. In this 
sense, I am inclined to agree with Tony Burns that The Dispossessed is best read as a 
novel about utopianism rather than one depicting a utopia (though my reasoning differs 
greatly from Burns’s).89 Anarres is certainly a place, and much of it is good; but it needs 
more affect aliens to organiseorganize around their disaffected alienation and challenge 
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that which is bad if it is to become an affective utopia. A different telling of Anarres may 
provide us with this, however, but we can never fully separate any place from its creation 
through narrative. 
 Nonetheless, engaging actively with Anarres does provide the reader with an 
understanding of how utopia as developed in this article might function. As such, The 
Dispossessed remains a very useful book about utopianism. We see that places can be 
constituted through immanent intra-actions, and that it is possible for places to produce 
and be (re)produced by this power-with. In other words, by temporally and conceptually 
reading beyond the limits of the text (by imagining what happens once the novel leaves 
Anarres; and by applying perspectives or knowledges absent from the narrative) we can 
imagine how Anarres might become a utopia in the future.90 
 
<1>Conclusion 
Through an engagement with a variety of political, social, and geographical theory;, and 
with the society of Anarres as depicted in Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, this article 
has rethought utopia as “the good place that is no place.” It has drawn on understandings 
of place as a dynamic form constituted in time through the intra-action of bodies. It has 
suggested that these intra-actions are “good” when they nonhierarchically produce 
affective power-with; and that this “good” can be “ambiguously” enhanced by the 
articulation of oppressive relations of domination. Nonetheless, I have argued that we can 
only ever ambiguously assert whether any given place constitutes such a utopia, for 
information about power relations is necessarily partial and situated,; even when we are 
“reading” a place from its outside (as I did with Anarres). I have also posited a 
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relationship between utopianism and utopia in which the former produces the latter 
affectively (and is then reproduced by it), rather than being oriented to a predetermined 
ideal vision. This takes us a long way from More’s Utopia of 1516. And yet, at the same 
time it does not. Places change; and concepts change. We can go back to utopia, so long 
as we understand that utopia is a place where we have never been. 
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